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INTRODUCTION 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) could become an instrumental part of a futwce 
carbon trading system in the United States. If the U.S. starts operating an emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) similar to that of the European Union’s then limits on C02 
emissions will be conservative in the beginning stages. The government will most likely 
start by distributing most credits for .free; these free credits are called allowances. The 
U.S. may follow the model of the EU ETS, which during the first five-year phase 
distributed 95 YO of the credits for free, bringing that level down to 90% for the second 
five-year phase. As the number of free allowances declines, companies will be forced to 
purchase an increasing number of credits at government auction, or else obtain them from 
companies selling surplus credits. In addition to reducing the number of credits allocated 
for free, with each subsequent trading period the number of overall credits released into 
the market will decline in an effort to gradually reduce overall emissions. Companies 
may face financial difficulty as the value of credits continues to rise due to the reduction 
of the number of credits available in the market each trading period. Governments 
operating emissions trading systems face the challenge of achieving CO2 emissions 
targets without placing such a financial burden on their companies that the country’s 
economy is markedly affected. 
To create market flexibility and thereby ease some of the economic hardship 
created by emissions trading, existing trading systems in the E.U. and Norway have 
devised ways to achieve the target emissions reduction without forcing companies to buy 
credits covering all of their emissions. One option companies have is to secure credits 
called offsets. To receive an offset a company can reduce CO2 emissions of an operation 
not covered by the cap and trade system; this means reducing emissions abroad or 
reducing the emissions of a small operation not answerable to the nation’s ETS. In this 
way, the company is still reducing COz emissions, but it is a less expensive alternative to 
reducing emissions created by their own operations. 
There are several different classifications for offset projects defined by the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Accords. Projects are characterized in the 
following categories: biological sequestration, industrial gases, methane capture, energy- 
efficiency, and renewable energy projects (Kollmus et. al, 2008). Not all of these project 
types are equally effective, and each must undergo rigorous examination to determine 
whether the project merits the assignment of an offset credit. Although offsets are a 
valuable option in an ETS, in the EU and in Norway limits have been placed on the 
number of offsets a company can earn in order to encourage the company to make the 
more expensive, real reduction in COz emissions from their own installations. Norway, 
for example, only allows 20% of a companies total carbon credits to be offset credits. 
After a company has attained a maximum allowable number of offsets, it then needs to 
seek out additional ways to reduce emissions, and CCS projects could provide additional 
C02 reduction. Because of the similarity between offset projects and CCS projects, 
protocols pertaining to CCS projects could ultimately be derived from the existing 
.framework that assesses the effectiveness of existing offset projects. 
credits on the market will eventually become too costly, at which point CCS projects will 
become a viable option for companies trying to stay in operation. The credits that will be 
Although CCS technology is expensive at present, as an ETS progresses buying 
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awarded for CCS projects are called Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs). ERCs are 
credits granted to a company for voluntarily reducing emissions below the required level. 
ERCs can thus be used against future emissions in the quantity specified by the ERC. 
Because credits can be banked during each five-year trading period, ERCs are valuable 
assets that can be saved, accumulated, and traded. 
There is the potential for widespread use of CCS technology under an upcoming 
emissions trading system, but because this technology is still being developed and is not 
yet cost effective, it has not been used in any of the trading systems currently in 
existence. Steps are just now beginning to be taken to integrate a set of protocols for 
CCS into the existing carbon trading protocols in the E.U., Norway, and Australia. 
Despite these preliminary steps, there is still much work that needs to be done in 
organizing a framework for permitting CCS sites and for granting ERCs to completed 
projects. The following paper will propose ways in which these two developments might 
be addressed. 
GUIDELINES FOR CCS PROJECTS TO BE PERMITTED 
Before it is possible to set in place a system for allocating ERC’s to companies 
who employ CCS technologies to reduce their GHG emissions, it is necessary to establish 
benchmarks defining a successful CCS project. The most basic requirement of a CCS 
project is that it poses no danger to public health and safety, nor can it cause damage to 
surrounding ecosystems. Assuming the safety of the project has been successfully 
demonstrated in the characterization phase, the net step is to determine how long the C02 
must remain contained underground in order for the project to be effective in the long- 
term reduction of atmospheric GHG levels. Estimates indicate that if 60 to 95% of the 
C02 remained underground for approximately 500 years the sequestration effort would 
be viable (Rubin et. al, 2005). In order to reach this 500 year mark, the leakage rate from 
the storage site should not exceed 0.1 % a year. With a leakage rate as great as 1 % a year, 
as has sometimes been considered acceptable, most of the C02 would return to the 
atmosphere in just 400 years (Hepple et. al, 2003). With the acceptable leakage rate 
established at 0.1% a year we have set an important standard in assessing the success of a 
CCS project that will help us determine whether the company undertaking the project 
will be granted the desired ERCs. 
In establishing a maximum permissible leakage rate another important 
consideration is whether routine Monitoring, Measurement and Verification ( M M V )  
techniques will be able to detect leakage levels of the specified magnitude. One concern 
is that small scale CCS projects may inject such a small amount of C02 that any leakage 
from such a site could not be monitored. However, studies (Oldenburg et. al, 2003) 
demonstrate that the Eddy Covariance (EC) technique has the capability to measure a 
C02 flux as small as 4.4 x 10‘’ kgm-2s-’. Other techniques such as the Accumulation 
Chamber (AC) method can measure a similar flux magnitude. Because conditions can 
vary widely between sites, the figures from Oldenburg et. al, 2003 may not always be 
achievable. Therefore, for most projects several MMV techniques with different 
capabilities will be used. Despite this, we will use this figure for CO;! flux to make 
several assumptions about the level of leakage that may be detectable. 
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Figure 1, based on the Statoil's CCS demonstration project at Sleipner, provides 
an estimation of how much C02 flux would be present over varying surface areas after 
several different time periods. At Sleipner 2,800 metric tons of C02 are injected each 
day, resulting in the sequestration of 1.02 million metric tons each year. Assuming that 
0.1% of the sequestered COZ leaks each year, and neglecting the effects of transit time 
from the C02 bearing formation to the surface, the C02 flux at the surface has been 
calculated as a function of the surface area over which the CO2 reaches the atmosphere. 
In practice the travel time for the C02 to transit the subsurface would need to be added to 
the time shown in the figure. Small surface areas, on the order of five to ten kilometers, 
would represent C02 leaking from a single fault system (e.g. 5 km = 1 km in extent). C02 
being dispersed in the subsurface and reaching the surface over a broad area might leak 
from a 100 km2 area. The flux rates shown in figure 1 can be scaled by the volume of 
C02 in place. It can be assumed that a commercial scale project would inject at least ten 
times this volume of C02 each day, thus the illustrated model represents a very small 
CCS project. 
Figure 1: 
Estimated COz Flux for the Sleipner CCS 
Surface Area (km') 
I year 
- Syears 
In Figure 1 the horizontal black dashed line illustrates the flux level detectable 
using the EC technique. C02 leaking from a single fault zone with a 5 km2 area would be 
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Class I Wells 
Class I1 Wells 
Inject non-hazardous liquid, municipal wastewaters or hazardous 
wastes beneath the lowermost USDW. Most often they are the deepest 
UIC wells. 
Inject fluids from conventional oil or natural gas production, enhanced 
Class I11 Wells 
As the practice of geologic sequestration of C02 proliferates under a carbon trading 
system the need for a new classification will arise. The EPA has proposed the creation of 
a sixth classification to specifically address the new challenges geologic sequestration 
presents (EPA, 2008). 
process specific to geologic sequestration. In consideration of the peculiarities of each 
CCS site, the EPA proposes what they call a “Tailored Requirements Approach” to 
permitting. This includes previously established technical standards for deep-well 
injection of non-hazardous fluids where appropriate and later adapting them in 
consideration of the challenges of long-term C02 storage. This gives permitting 
authorities the flexibility to alter certain provisions of the recommended protocols in 
order to either heighten security when needed or to relax burdensome standards in cases 
when they are unnecessary. 
The creation of a new classification establishes the task of designing a permitting 
oil and gas production, and liquid hydrocarbons. 
Inject fluids associated with the extraction of minerals or energv. 
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Class N Wells 
Class V Wells 
., “4 
Inject hazardous or radioactive wastes into or above USDWs. Very few 
of these are in use today. 
All injected wells that are not included in the other four classes. Class 
V wells are generally experimental technology wells, and today include 
geologic seauestration Dilot Droiects. 
AN AUSTRALIAN EXAMPLE 
The EPA has also made strides in identifying many of the responsibilities 
delegated to the owners or operators of a CCS project once injection has begun, however 
a final system may be able to draw from a proposed Australian framework. The Offshore 
Petroleum Amendment Bill (Australian Office of General Counsel, 2008) created an 
Australian legal framework for granting permits to CCS projects. By combining aspects 
of the Australian bill with the proposals by the U.S. EPA a comprehensive permitting 
system could be realized in the US. 
The first permit granted in the Australian system is the GHG assessment permit. 
This allows the permit holder to perform four “key greenhouse gas operations, including: 
drilling a well, injecting small quantities of GHGs for site appraisal, conducting seismic 
surveys, and monitoring the behavior of the stored GHG. The GHG assessment permit 
stays in effect for six years. 
After the owners and operators have proved that their site is an Identified GHG 
Storage Formation, they can begin the process of applying for an Injection License. To 
attain the characterization of an Identified GHG Storage Formation the permit holder 
must submit a battery of information, including: their reason’s for believing that the site 
is suitable for permanent storage, the quantity of GHG suitable to store, the particular 
GHG that will be stored, the proposed injection points, the proposed injection period, the 
proposed engineering enhancements, the sealing feature, and the spatial extent of the 
storage formation including the expected migration pathways. After the permitting 
authority has reviewed these submissions and declared the site in question to be an 
Identified GHG Storage Formation, there as several other elements that must be taken 
into consideration. A n  “impacts test” must be performed to determine whether granting 
the injection license for this particular site would be in the public interest. Next it must 
be proved that the owners and operators have the technical and financial resources to 
complete the project in accordance with regulatory procedures. Finally, the owners and 
operators must be in the position to start injection within five years of receiving the 
license. 
years of their site classification as an Identified GHG Storage Formation, then they may 
apply for a GHG Holding Lease. This lease will remain in effect for five years, and may 
be renewed once. This gives the owner and operators rights to the site for a period of 
years during which they may obtain enough GHGs for injection. When they are 
eventually ready to inject the GHGs they can easily apply for an Injection License. 
If the owners and operators are not in the position to begin injection within five 
THE US.  EPA PROPOSAL 
These Australian regulations provide a solid process that can be used to grant 
drilling and injection rights to applicants, however, the EPA proposal has a more 
comprehensive set of demands for owners and operators once the injection process has 
begun. Owners or operators of Class VI wells must report semi-annually to the permitting 
authority on: the physical and chemical nature of injection fluids, injection pressure, flow 
rate, temperature, volume and annular pressure, annulus fluid volume added, the results 
of mechanical integrity testing, plume tracking, and atmospheric and soil gas monitoring 
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(EPA, 2008). In addition, plans of the Area of Review (AoR), referred to by the 
Australian requirements as the demand that owners or operators submit an estimation of 
the spatial extent of the storage formation and the expected migration pathways, play an 
integral role in the regular monitoring of the injection site. AoRs indicate the importance 
of extending the survey of the underground formations beyond simply the expected 
storage site so as to ensure that the GHGs do not travel to other areas unexpectedly (EPA, 
2008). 
The EPA strongly believes that AoRs should be conducted regularly as part of 
routine MMV procedures. Although they have not been able to determine an absolute 
requirement for the frequency with which AoRs should be conducted, the EPA has 
resolved that at no time should the AoR reevaluations occur less often than every 10 
years (EPA, 2008). Along with these AoRs the owners and operators must submit a 
corrective plan in the event of an unexpected migration (EPA, 2008). 
Another strength of the EPA proposal is the definition of the site care period 
between the end of injection and the attainment of a site closure certificate. The length of 
this period is still debated; many environmental programs find 30 years adequate, 
however the storage of C02 creates different concerns, which will likely require a longer 
period. To determine the length of this period for CCS projects the EPA proposes a 
combination of a fixed timefiame and a performance standard based approach. Studies 
done by Flett, M., Gurton R., and G. Weir. 2007; Obi E.I., and M.J. Blunt. 2006; and 
Doughty, C.2007 indicate that the C02 plume could stabilize anywhere within a 10 to 100 
year time frame, and site specifics play a large role in deterrnining this outcome. To 
account for this the EPA plans to set 50 years as a flexible site care period that may be 
adjusted at the authority’s discretion if owners or operators have demonstrated that the 
C02 plume has stabilized (EPA, 2008). 
closure certification that allows the licensee to surrender his title. In order to receive this 
certification the owners or operators must submit a site closure report and a non- 
endangerment demonstration showing that conditions in the subsurface indicate no 
additional monitoring is needed (EPA, 2008). However, before the owner or operator can 
abandon the site completely, for three years following site closure they must continue to 
basic MMV record keeping and reporting. 
oversee all of the elements of the CCS permitting and crediting processes. Under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) the EPA has a clear title to ensuring the protection of 
USDWs (Underground Source of Drinking Water); this entitles the EPA to regulate the 
injection of C02 underground. The EPA acknowledges however, that “the SDWA does 
not provide authority to develop regulations for all areas related to GS (geologic 
sequestration)” (EPA, 2008). In order to create a comprehensive and streamlined 
permitting and crediting system, the EPA, or some other governing body, will need the 
authority to regulate injection, the site assessment process, property rights, and the 
certification of GHG reductions. The EPA indicates that the Clean Air Act may provide 
enough latitude for them to claim rights in regulating more of the CCS process, however 
to achieve the fully integrated permitting and crediting process that has been suggested it 
is necessary that the Congress pass legislation that gives the EPA, or some other body, a 
clear and complete title to regulating all CCS operations and crediting. 
After the site care period has ended the owners or operators may apply for a site 
In the United States there is currently no authority in place that has the rights to 
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PROPOSED ERC PROTOCOLS FOR U.S. CCS PROJECTS 
The proposed protocols combine the current EPA proposals with the structure that 
the Australian protocols provide. What remains missing is the piece concerning the 
ERCs, which I propose to incorporate into the permitting framework. Although carbon 
offset projects designated under the CDM do not have permitting processes that are 
directly relevant to permitting for CCS, the system of integrating the permitting process 
with the achievement of offset credits has been a success. The most important 
considerations in assigning ERCs to a CCS project will now be addressed, along with an 
explanation of how they fit in to the CCS permitting framework. 
A well-defined and comprehensive permitting process specific to CCS projects 
will allow ERCs to be assigned with relative ease. The permitting process will help to 
identify whether the company sequestering the C02 is appropriately addressing the 
specific standards deemed necessary to qualify the company for receiving ERCs. 
Mandatory requirements for receiving an ERC have been derived from the standards 
applied to offset credits. These requirements are as follows: the stored C02 must be real, 
surplus, quantifiable, unique, and verifiable. Key elements of the proposed protocols are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2: Key El 
Feature 
GHG Assessment Period 
Determination of Project’s 
Eligibility to Receive 
ERC’s 
Method of Payment for 
ERC’s 
Penalty for Leakage 
Site Monitoring 
Obligations 
Liability for the Site 
EOR Proiects 
ments of the Proposed CCS Crediting Protocol 
Exdanation 
A key part of the permitting process, this determines if the 
site is safe and desirable for a CCS project. 
It must be determined that the stored C02 is real, surplus, 
quantifiable, unique and verifiable. 
ERCs are put into an Escrow fund and paid out over a three- 
year period. If leakage rates above the acceptable level 
occur then a proportion of the awarded credits must be paid 
back and the project owner must pay an additional fine. 
For a leakage over 0.1% some proportion of the ERCs paid 
to the owner must be returned for each year the leakage 
continues. In addition the owner will be subject to a fine 
upon discovery of the leakage. 
Extensive MMV over the injection period must take place. 
Following the end of the injection there is a fifty-year 
(subject to adjustment) site care period with an AoR survey 
done a minimum of even ten vears. 
The permit holder retains liability for the site until the site 
closure certificate is granted from which point on the 
government must claim liability for the site. The permit 
holder alone is entitled to receive ERC credits from the 
permitting authority. 
EOR projects may be considered additional if the C02 used 
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has been captured during industrial processes. ERCs will 
also be assigned based on the degree to which the produced 
oil is “carbon free”. EOR projects wishing to be credited 
will be under Well Classification VI. 
To be “real” stored C02 must create an actual reduction in the emissions of the 
company; as such there cannot be leakages from the storage site that compromise the act 
of injecting the C02 in the first place. Within the protocols for granting ERCs the issue of 
“real” reductions must specifically be addressed to ensure that leakage occurring after the 
assignment of the ERC result in both a payback proportional to the amount leaked and a 
punitive damage component. Although this issue has yet to be addressed, existing 
permitting procedures do provide for the stringent monitoring of leakage, in both its pre- 
injection surveys of the site and in its provisions for regulations post-injection. 
that the amount of C02 sequestered be in excess of the companies reduction obligations 
in order to receive the ERC. The need to verify a surplus is also commonly referred to as 
setting a baseline, and is addressed comprehensively in the CDM qualifications for offset 
credits. The Kyoto Protocol considers an offset project viable only if the offset emission 
comes from a project that would not have occurred in the absence of the possible credit; 
that is, the project must have additionality. Establishing the additionality of a project is 
not addressed by the Australian or U.S. EPA proposals because it is unique to the subject 
of crediting. This condition can be easily incorporated into the permitting process by 
following the CDM model. Operators of CDM offset projects are required to submit a 
Project Design Document, which must include estimations of the project baseline and 
justifications for those approximations. The Project Design Document could be adapted 
for CCS projects and a provision could be added to applying for and Injection License 
requiring it. CDM offset projects also require rigorous verification after the project is 
underway to ensure that the baseline was properly estimated, and that the operator did not 
exaggerate the net reductions of the project. This will be a necessary part of regulating 
CCS projects; along with the regular MMV reports, there needs to be provisions for 
verification by a third party that the project’s claimed reductions are indeed real. 
reduction. The C02 that is actually stored, that is excluding fugitive emissions at the time 
of capture, transport, and injection, must be easily accounted for so that the proper 
amount of ERCs can be granted. This provision has been adequately provided for by the 
permitting protocols, in their detailed design for routine MMV, which will be able to 
ascertain the quantity of COZ sequestered with enough accuracy to assign the ERCs. 
A geologic sequestration project is “unique” if the company desiring to do the 
sequestration holds a clear title to the site where the sequestration is to occur and thus is 
the rightful owner of the ERCs that are to be distributed for the project. Additionally, the 
ERCs themselves, granted on behalf of the project must be unique; therefore there must 
be a strict serialization and registration process in place to ensure against double 
counting. Careful accounting for ERCs must be integrated into MMV routines following 
the start of injection. 
The next condition, that injected C02 must be “surplus”, refers to the necessity 
To be “quantifiable” the sequestered C02 must create a readily discemable net 
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Regarding the issue of the site title-holder, this condition is preliminarily 
addressed by the permitting process, whose underlying purpose is to grant the title of 
temporary ownership of the storage site. Despite this, terms of the Australian permitting 
process may need to be clarified to address the different claims of the company wishing 
to sequester its C02 and the third party company hired to operate the site. A provision 
should be invoked stating that all ERCs for a given CCS project will only be issued to the 
party in possession of the Injection License, thus the owner of the site should be the 
company wishing to attain the ERCs. The owner then subcontracts the company 
operating the injection. The operator has no claim to ownership of the site and will 
receive none of the ERCs granted for the project; instead the operator will be paid 
directly by the owner. There is however some latitude in adjusting this arrangement, for 
example the owner and the operator may wish to negotiate a different system of payment. 
One possibility would be to make an agreement that affords the operator the right to a 
certain percentage of the ERCs obtained from the project in lieu of a service fee. While 
this agreement is perfectly viable, this is still a contract between the owner of the site and 
the operator, and it is not the responsibility of the crediting authorities to pay the ERCs 
directly to the operator. Instead it is duty of the owner, who will receive all the ERCs 
from the permitting authorities, to transfer the appropriate number of ERCs to the 
operator. 
Finally the sequestered C02 must be “verifiableyy, that is, a third party must track 
its movements or leakages. Each step of the permitting process, from the GHG 
assessment permit to the site-closing certificate, strives to ascertain that the behaviors of 
the stored GHGs are routinely measured and monitored. The EPA has outlined specific 
requirements for the types of MMY techniques and the extent to which MMV is 
employed in detail. This ensures that all third party verifiers will perform to the same 
high standard and thus gives credibility to the verification process. 
The proposed seamless integration of these five ERC qualifications into the 
permitting system, will allow for a streamlined process of allotting ERCs to the owners of 
geologic sequestration projects. The achievement of all five must be verified before the 
injection license can be granted, as such, the distribution of credits should be able to 
commence at the time of injection. Figure 2 illustrates a timeline of the permitting 
process integrated with the ERC achievement period. 
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Figure 2: Timeline Illustrating Example CCS 
Pro i ect 
61-1G Assessment Period 
lnpctlon License 
Injrclron Pel lod 
Ciedit Pay out pcriad 
Site care pet iod 
liilMV period after site closing 
Figure 2 shows a timeline for an example CCS project. For this example, the duration 
of each phase of the project has been estimated at its maximum number of years. 
Injection of enough C02 to fill the storage site may take as many as thirty years to 
complete. With such an extended period, we must address how the ERCs are to be 
granted for the GHGs sequestered over this timeframe. One approach is to place the 
ERCs into an Escrow fund whose pay out period is set at some fraction of the total 
predicted injection time. For example, for a project with a t m  year expected injection 
time, the pay out period could be on a three year interval. With a three year pay-out, at 
the end of the first year of injection one third of the ERCs applicable to that year’s tons of 
injected CO2e would be given to the owner. For the subsequent two years the remaining 
thirds would be paid out. Because injection takes place over an extended time period, the 
owner would receive payments for up to three different years at a time. For two years 
after the end of injection the company would be receiving that last of its ERC payments. 
Payment of the ERCs begins immediately under the condition that M M Y  reports 
show that there are no unexpected leakages or problems surfacing that are unaddressed 
by the site plan. Payment will continue according to the pay out schedule assuming that 
the leakage rate from the storage site remains under 0.1 YO a year. If leakage rate rises 
above that threshold the project will be considered ineffective in achieving a goal of long- 
term atmospheric GHG reductions, and thus the project owners will suffer several 
penalties. At the discovery of the leakage all future ERC payments will be held. The 
owner will also be subjected to an immediate penalty, in the form of a fine. Additionally, 
the owner will be forced to surrender a proportion of his ERCs each year the leakage 
continues. The owner is required to make an attempt at repairing the leakage. If this is 
accomplished, that is the leakage is reduced to below the 0.1 % a year threshold, the 
owner no longer must surrender ERCs. The owner is then f?ee the next year to begin 
collecting ERCs again for the tons of C02e stored, however more stringent monitoring 
standards will be applied to the site. 
proportion of ERCs each year. The owner still retains liability for the site, and must 
continue to submit the same MMY reports each year. If the site is deemed safe and stable 
over a period of years then the owner will still be able to apply for a site closing 
certification, and can then eventually relinquish liability for the site. 
If the owner is not able to repair the leakage he will continue to pay back the set 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERCs FOR ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY PROJECTS 
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) projects present a unique situation for the 
proposed permitting and crediting process. The first question regarding EOR that must 
be addressed, is whether EOR projects meet all of the standards that qualify a CCS 
project for receiving ERCs. Using the Kyoto definition of additionality, EOR projects 
currently in operation do not merit the compensation of ERCs (de Coninck, 3). Kyoto 
outlines several tests for project additionality; simply put, the goal of these tests is to 
discern whether or not the project would be been undertaken in the absence of receiving 
an ERC. If the test determines that the project would indeed have occurred regardless of 
the ERC, then the project is not additional. The Investment Test is applicable to EOR, 
stating that the revenue from the credits received on behalf of the project must be the 
decisive reason for implementing the project (Kollmus et. al, 2008). Based on this test, 
current EOR projects do not pass because revenue from the oil attained is the primary 
motivation for the project. 
projects should not receive ERCs, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has posed 
examples of EOR projects that could meet the standards of additionality. For these future 
projects CCS protocol must address how ERCs will be assigned. This proposed protocol 
dictates that under no circumstances can an EOR project receive ERCs for re-injecting 
CO2 unless the CO;! used in the project has been acquired from an emission source. If the 
CO2 is instead obtained from geologic formations then the goal of the emission reduction 
is entirely compromised since no net reduction in atmospheric CO2 levels is achieved. 
The project owners will then receive ERCs for the C02 that is separated from the 
recovered oil and re-injected into the well. In this case the Investment Test does not 
apply, because the cost of capturing the C02 at the emission source exceeds the cost of 
getting the COz from underground, thus awarding ERCs to an EOR project provides the 
incentive to reduce overall emissions. 
which the oil produced is “carbon free”. The DOE asserts that the oil produced by EOR 
projects is up to 70% “carbon free”, in comparison to imported oil that is 0% “carbon 
free”, and domestic corn ethanol that is only 10 to 15% “carbon fiee”. The DOE 
estimates that a typical barrel of crude oil contains 0.42 metric tons of releasable CO2, 
whereas a barrel of crude oil obtained through EOR could contain as little as 0.26 metric 
tons (Kuuskraa et. al, 2008). Calculations could be done for the total number of barrels 
produced by the EOR project to determine how many metric tons of releasable C02 were 
avoided, and based on that number additional ERCs could be assigned. 
Permitting and well classification are the greatest problems in granting ERCs for 
EOR projects. Current EOR projects are included under the U.S. EPA’s second well 
classification, while commercial CCS projects are to be placed in a sixth well 
classification. Because the crediting process is unique to and dependent on the permitting 
framework of Well Class VI, it is altogether necessary that EOR projects aiming to 
achieve ERCs are fit into this classification. EOR projects not aiming to achieve credits 
may remain in the second classification so that they do not face unnecessary burdens. 
Credited EOR projects in Class VI will face more stringent requirements however there is 
Although Kyoto tests for additionality provide sound reasons why current EOR 
The second component of the ERC granting process must address the degree to 
12 
enough flexibility in the crediting system to account for site specific needs that this will 
not be cumbersome to project owners. 
Ownership of the ERCs granted is more complicated for an EOR project than for 
a typical CCS project. The oil company, as the permit holder, has exclusive rights to the 
ERCs. They are responsible to negotiate a method of payment with the emission source 
they receive the C02 from. If the oil company agrees to pay the emission source with 
ERCs this exchange is a private agreement between the two companies with no 
involvement from the permitting authority. 
JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
There are certainly other systems one could create for paying out ERCs to the 
owner of the stored C02, however, there are several reasons why delivering them in an 
Escrow type format is preferable. The suggested system provides a reminder to the 
owners that the hull payout of ERCs is contingent upon their adherence to the strict 
standards governing the stored C02. Paying out ERCs over a period of three years rather 
than up front helps ensure that the C02 storage is a long-term investment. 
The time frame chosen for the payout time is very important. If the time frame is 
too long, CCS projects may become less desirable to companies who need to acquire 
ERCs for the short term. For the substantial cost that is required to operate a CCS project 
there must be some form of pay off that companies can receive almost immediately for 
the project to remain lucrative. The suggested three-year time frame may need to be 
adjusted, but the ultimate timetable decided upon should realistically not be extended 
beyond ten years. Experience in offset trading supports this point; the Chicago Climate 
Exchange, North America’s first voluntary GHG emissions trading system, does not 
extend the crediting period of any offset project beyond the duration of 8 years (Kollmus 
et. al, 2008). In determining the optimum crediting period for CCS projects, one 
potentially critical factor is the estimated time from the point of injection that it will take 
to detect impending leakages with MMV techniques. If the timeframe for this is site 
specific then it is possible that the length of the pay out time frame could vary slightly 
between sites. 
many differences between sites, which is preferable to the more complicated systems, 
such as the Canadian offset crediting system. To summarize, the Canadians propose 
creating two different types of offset credits, permanent credits (PC) and temporary 
credits (TC), with different property rights associated with each. PCs and TCs differ in 
both the liability associated with each, and the value of the credit and the owner of the 
project can choose which type of credit to apply for (Thomassin, 2006). Although this 
system provides a greater degree of flexibility, the more uniform proposed system 
prevents confusion in the issuance of ERCs, alleviating a good deal of administrative 
complexity. Additionally, a system that is easy for the company owners to understand 
makes it more probable that they will want to engage in a CCS project. 
The suggested system is straightforward and can be applied universally without 
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CONCLUSION 
These proposed protocols for assigning ERCs to geologic carbon sequestration 
projects offer much room for adjustment and change. The final permitting and crediting 
system for CCS projects cannot be decided until a national carbon trading system has 
been initiated in the United States. By looking at the progress made by other countries to 
establish protocols specific to CCS, this proposal has identified several key components 
that should be addressed in the U.S. system. 
Above all it is important that a more comprehensive permitting process is put in 
place to ensure that CCS projects are only initiated after extensive assessments of the 
safety and viability of the site. The entire permitting process must also be integrated with 
the crediting process in order to increase efficiency and streamline record keeping. A 
detailed regimen for monitoring and verification must be established to ensure the safety 
of the site and to address any leakages that may affect the receipt of ERCs. There have 
been many proposed methods for awarding credits over the injection period. Although 
the proposed method of issuing them may need to be adjusted, it is important that owners 
of CCS projects are held responsible to return the ERCs if they do not meet the terms of 
the agreement at some point while they retain liability for the site. One of the 
complications in devising protocols governing CCS projects is uniqueness of each site. 
Over time a balance will have to be achieved to allow a certain degree of flexibility for 
site specific decisions while still preserving a framework rigid enough to ensure safe 
operation and fair delegation of ERCs. 
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APPENDIX I 
AoR: Area of Review 
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism 
CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage 
C02e: Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
EC: Eddy Covariance 
EOR: Enhanced Oil Recovery 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency 
ERC: Emission Reduction Credit 
EU ETS: European Union Emissions Trading System 
GHG: Green House Gas 
GS: Geologic Sequestration 
M M Y :  Measurement, Monitoring, and Verification 
SDWA: Safe Drinking Water Act 
UIC: Underground Injection Control 
USDW: Underground Source of Drinking Water 
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